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 19 A challenge to the global liberal order?
The growing Chinese relationship with Africa
Ian Taylor
The expansion of Chinese political and corporate interests into Africa is arguably the most
important development for the continent since the end of the Cold War. Oﬃcial trade
ﬁgures alone bear testimony to the exponential speed with which the Chinese presence in
Africa has grown in recent times. China is now Africa’s second largest bilateral trading partner,
behind the USA, but ahead of both France and the United Kingdom, despite the latter two’s
historic and long-standing relations with the continent. Published trade ﬁgures are indicative
of this massive surge in Chinese economic interest in Africa. In 1996, the value of China’s
trade with Africa was US $4,000m.; by 2008, this had grown to $106,700m.
Much of this expansion is driven by a desire to obtain sources of raw materials and energy
for China’s ongoing economic growth and new export markets for Chinese producers and
traders compelled to seek new markets by domestic dynamics within China’s economy. Oﬃcial
trade between Africa and China began noticeably to accelerate around 2000 and, between
2001 and 2006, Africa’s exports to China rose at an annual rate of over 40% (Wang, J. 2007,
5). This chapter seeks to place China’s role in Africa into its historical context as well as
examine the political and economic implications for Africa of an increase in the Chinese
presence on the continent.
China’s Africa policies
Domestically, the post-Mao Chinese state has been arguably based on ‘an unwritten social
contract between the party and the people where the people do not compete with the party
for political power as long as the party looks after their economic fortunes’ (Breslin 2005,
749). Externally, ‘foreign policy that sustains an international environment supportive of
economic growth and stability in China serves these objectives’ (Sutter 2008, 2). The devel-
oping world has long been a particular area where the Chinese government’s foreign poli-
tical policy has been pursued actively, using the development of ‘common interests’ with the
South to raise China’s global stature and increase China’s bargaining leverage with the
USA. Economically, Africa has emerged as a relatively important factor in Chinese calcu-
lations at multiple levels, whether state, provincial, municipal or individual. Within such
calculations, the need to project China’s peaceful development (heping fazhan) provides a broad
framework, albeit often constrained and/or frustrated by the actions of China’s growing
diversity of actors.
Chinese engagement with Africa is long-standing (see Duyvendak 1949; Hutchison 1975;
Snow 1988; Han 1990; Taylor 2006a). Politically, Africa has been diplomatically important
for China since the late 1950s, when Chinese diplomacy began to emerge from the fall-out
of the Korean War and the shadow of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
 During the early period of Sino-African interaction, China’s role was ideologically motivated
and included support for national liberation movements as well as direct state-to-state aid,
most noticeably with Tanzania (Yu, G. 1970, 1975). Indeed, by the mid-1970s, China had a
greater amount of aid projects in Africa than the USA.
Yet, as the Socialist Modernization programme picked up under Deng Xiaoping from the
late 1970s onwards, there was a concomitant scaling-down of Chinese interest in the continent,
although Chinese policy-makers have always denied this (see Taylor 1997). This can in part
be explained by the fact that:
Africa’s failure to develop its economies eﬃciently and open up to the international market
militated against Chinese policy aims, and the increasing extraneous role the continent
played in global (read superpower) geopolitics resulted in a halt to closer Chinese invol-
vement. Essentially, Beijing not only viewed Africa as largely immaterial in its quest for
modernization, but also saw that the rationale behind its support for anti-Soviet elements
in the continent was no longer valid.
(Taylor 1998, 443–444)
In contrast to the past, Chinese ties with Africa were based on the cool realities of trade and proﬁt.
However, an event and two processes—one within Africa and the other within China—came
together to stimulate the current close involvement of Chinese actors in Africa. First, the events
of 4 June 1989 following the pro-democracy protests in and around Tiananmen Square meant
that the Chinese government underwent a major re-evaluation of its foreign policy towards the
developing world. While Tiananmen Square resulted in an (albeit temporary) crisis in China’s
relations with the West, Africa’s reaction was far more muted, if not openly supportive. As
the then Chinese Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs, Qian Qichen (2005, 200) put it, ‘it was … our
African friends who stood by us and extended a helping hand in the diﬃcult times following
the political turmoil in Beijing, when Western countries imposed sanctions on China’. Indeed,
Angola’s Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, for example, expressed support for the suppression of the
‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’, while Namibia’s Sam Nujoma sent a telegram of congratula-
tions to the Chinese army. As one commentator noted, ‘the events of June 1989 … did not
aﬀect the PRC’s relations with the Third World as it did with the Western world … what
changed [was] the PRC’s attitude towards the Third World countries, which … turned
from one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis’ (Gu, W. 1995, 125).
As a result, the developing world was ostensibly elevated in Chinese thinking to become a
cornerstone of the Chinese government’s foreign policy. Post-1989 the 1970s rhetoric of
China being an ‘all-weather friend’ (quan tianhou pengyou) of Africa was dusted oﬀ and
deployed with vigour, and this has remained the case today (Taylor 2004). This posture is a
reaﬃrmation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence discussed by Wang Zhengyi in
this volume. Thus, Chinese policy-makers have returned to their roots in reasserting what is
in fact an old theme in China’s foreign policy.
The two macro-processes were, ﬁrst, that, as Africa’s economic reform programmes
gained momentum in the 1990s, the Chinese government began to believe that the mac-
roeconomic situation in Africa was taking a favourable turn, with resultant opportunities for
Chinese commerce. This analysis was based on the belief that African countries have
adopted a set of active measures to push forward the pace of privatization, open up inter-
national trade and carry out reform based on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
An implicit proposition is that African economies have begun to copy China in its open-door
policy.
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 China has sought to take advantage of these developments in Africa and has oﬃcially
encouraged joint ventures and economic co-operation at multiple levels. This is coupled
with the belief held by many Chinese manufacturers and entrepreneurs that the types of goods
(household appliances, garments, and other domestic products) that Chinese producers
make and sell have immense potential in Africa, where the economy is not yet as developed
as in Western nations and where consumers are perceived to be more receptive to the type
of inexpensive products that Chinese manufacturers typically produce. That the domestic
markets of many African countries are relatively small and that there is relatively little com-
petition means that market share can be large almost from day one of operations. Additionally,
Africa is perceived by both the Chinese government and by Chinese companies to be rich in
natural resources, particularly in crude petroleum, non-ferrous metals and ﬁsheries.
The above then links up with the second macro-process, namely that China’s rapidly
developing economy in itself propels Sino-African trade. China’s growth in recent years has
been extraordinary and needs no rehearsing here. However, what is often overlooked in
discussions of Sino-African ties is that the signiﬁcance of China to Africa has to be appre-
ciated in terms of China’s own development trajectory. China’s real economic growth—on
average just under 9% annually for the last 30 years—has been grounded in growth in exports
averaging over 17%. This commerce is based on Chinese factories processing and assembling
parts and materials that originate from outside China. China’s leadership is dependent on
this high-speed growth continuing, as, with the eﬀective abandonment of Marxist ideology,
the only thing that legitimates continuing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule is eco-
nomic growth. However, growing saturation of China’s existing export markets as well as a
rapid increase in the price of imported raw materials (due in the main to Chinese demand
increasing prices) makes Africa more and more important to China’s economy. Indeed, as
the growth in the worth of Chinese exports decelerates, China has to maintain the growth
of its economy by adding more Chinese ‘content’ to its exports. Getting hold of sources of raw
materials is integral to this strategy and requirement, and this is where Africa ﬁts squarely
into Chinese foreign policy and domestic necessities. Indeed, it might be avowed that the
importance of Africa to China’s own development cannot be overstated.
Fight the power
Although maintaining good links with the US Administration in Washington, DC is fun-
damental to Chinese foreign policy, the developing world is becoming more and more impor-
tant in Chinese policy calculations. The Chinese government has often expressed concern
about the rise of an unchallenged hegemon, maintaining the opinion that in the current inter-
national system it is imperative that China and the developing world support each other
and work together to prevent the over-domination by this new hegemon. Asserting that respect
for each other’s aﬀairs and non-interference should be the basis of any new international
order is fundamental to this stance, as is a policy of accommodating, and hedging risks with,
the USA when deemed appropriate (Foot 2006).
With regard to Sino-African relations, this feeds into China’s long-held stance that it is
the leader of the developing world (formerly, the ‘Third World’). China’s leaders often repeat
the twin phrases of ‘Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries’
and ‘China is the biggest developing country’. Another frequent refrain in Sino-African
diplomacy is ‘Western powers, not China, colonized Africa and historically looted resources
there’—or some variety of the basic idea. Similarly, as former Chinese Minister of Foreign
Aﬀairs Qian Qichen put it, ‘as developing regions that … once suﬀered the oppression and
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 exploitation of imperialism and colonialism, China and the African countries … easily
understand each other’s pursuit of independence and freedom and … have a natural feeling
of intimacy’ (Qian 2005, 200). Such sentiments are utilized to argue that China and Africa
basically have the same interests and no conﬂicts—of course, whether there are in fact ‘interest
conﬂicts’ has animated a growing number of analysts of Sino-African relations.
Paradoxically, as China’s leaders increasingly integrate themselves into the global economy
and start tentatively to play by essentially Western rules, as exempliﬁed by China’s mem-
bership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), they have sought to strengthen political ties
with various African countries, arguably as, in part, a defence mechanism, to be deployed
against these very same impulses if and when they threaten inﬂuential domestic interests.
This irony reﬂects the overall tension in China’s diplomatic policy of pursuing both engage-
ment and a certain distant coolness vis-à-vis the global order (Breslin 2007; Lanteigne 2008).
This, and the notion that China seeks to ‘restore’ its ‘rightful place’ in world politics (Mosher
2000; Scott 2007) by being seen as some sort of leader of the developing world, while
casting itself as a ‘responsible power’ (fuzeren de daguo), is seen by many to be important ratio-
nales inﬂuencing policy. Certainly, such coalition-building can help to explain the recent
diplomatic developments in Chinese links to Africa, so graphically exempliﬁed by the Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meetings, held in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009.
FOCAC
The ﬁrst Forum met in October 2000 in Beijing and was attended by nearly 80 ministers
from 44 African countries. The second ministerial conference was held in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia in December 2003 and passed the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004–06). The FOCAC
Summit and the third ministerial conference were held in Beijing from November 2006.
The initial meeting essentially had three main objectives. First, the Forum was part of the
Chinese government’s overall strategy in its foreign policy to declare, even if only rhetorically,
its aim of overhauling the global order and to show traditional hostility to ‘hegemony’ (Blum
2003). This domination, dressed up as ‘globalization’ (qianqiuhua), is at times seen as detri-
mental to the autonomy and sovereignty of China and needs careful management (Breslin
2006). By extension, this applies to the developing world. As the then Chinese Premier, Zhu
Rongji, said at the Forum, Sino-African ties help ‘build up our capacity against possible
risks, which will put us in a better position to participate in economic globalization and
safeguard our economic interests and economic security’. They also ‘improve the standing
of the developing countries in North-South dialogue so as to facilitate the establishment of a
fair and rational new international political and economic order’ (Zhu, R. 2000).
Such a position is based on the belief, according to the then Minister of Foreign Trade and
Economic Co-operation, Shi Guangsheng, at the Sino-Africa Forum, that, ‘when the new
international economic order has not been established and countries diﬀer considerably in
economic development, the beneﬁts of economic globalization are not enjoyed in a balanced
way’. Consequently, ‘developed countries are beneﬁting most from economic globalization;
but the large number of developing countries are facing more risks and challenges, and some
countries are even endangered by marginalization’. As a result, the global community should
‘give more considerations to the will and demands of developing countries so as to promote
the establishment of a fair and rational new international economic order’. This can be
advanced by developing countries building ‘a sense of self-protection’ (Zhu, R. 2000).
Crucially, China’s leadership is intensely suspicious of the West’s promotion of human rights
and regards such calls as a Trojan horse through which the West might undermine China.
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 Importantly, the perceived Western strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian) being
exercised on China’s political security has been cast—not unreasonably—as being analo-
gous to regime change (Ong 2007). Chinese policy in this regard has then been consistently
to cast talk of liberal democracy and liberal conceptions of human rights (and, occasionally,
the environment) as a tool of neo-imperialism being practised towards both China and the
developing world. This falls on many receptive ears in Africa at the élite level, and China’s
policy-makers are not unaware of this. This posture has been fairly long-standing, and the
Chinese government has long managed to ride piggyback on the developing world’s power
of numbers to evade international condemnation.
As part of this, FOCAC serves as a means by which China can advance a position of moral
relativism regarding human rights to a mostly sympathetic audience, consolidating its standing
within African élite circles. Hence the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, released at the end of the meeting, asserted that ‘countries, that vary from one
another in social system, stages of development, historical and cultural background and values,
have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human
rights in their own countries’ (FMPRC 2000). Going further, the declaration made the claim
that ‘the politicization of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities’
themselves ‘constitute a violation of human rights’ and that conditionalities for development
assistance which are based on good governance and respect for human rights ‘should be vig-
orously opposed’. All this was music to the ears of many African leaders seated in the hall in
Beijing, no doubt, and all arguably crafted as a means to promote an ‘alternative’ global order.
The products of FOCAC reﬂect the increased priority that China’s leadership places on
Africa. The summit in late 2006 approved a three-year action plan to forge a ‘new type of
strategic partnership’ with the following tangible features:
 doubling of aid to Africa by 2009 (to about US $1,000m.)
 a $5,000m. China-Africa development fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest
in Africa
 $3,000m. in preferential loans and $2,000m. in preferential buyer’s credits to African
countries
 cancelling of all debt stemming from Chinese interest-free government loans that matured
by the end of 2005 for the 31 highly indebted and least developed countries in Africa
 further opening of China’s markets to exports from least developed African countries by
increasing the number of products receiving zero-tariﬀ treatment from 190 to 440
 training for 15,000 African professionals, doubling of the number of Chinese government
scholarships given annually to Africans (to 4,000) and sending of 100 senior agricultural
experts and 300 youth volunteers to the continent
 construction of 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centres and 100 rural schools.
Symbolic diplomacy and rhetorical ﬂourishes combined with some actual headline-grabbing
initiatives are, like all other countries’ foreign policies, integral to Chinese engagement with
Africa. But what is important in recognizing the impact of FOCAC are the growing economic
imperatives underpinning Sino-African linkages.
Economic relations
As suggested, the legitimacy of the CCP’s political system is today based upon the Party’s ability
to sustain economic growth. Intimately linked to this, China is faced with a long-term decline
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 in domestic oil production (Taylor 2006b). China’s policy-makers are actively encouraging
national companies aggressively to pursue oil and other natural resources in Africa. China is
currently the world’s second largest oil importer and the second largest consumer of African
resources. The abundance of natural resources in Africa has thus led Chinese corporations
to seek long-term deals with African governments in order to ensure continued access to all
varieties of raw materials and energy in Africa. As China’s national oil companies are largely
excluded from the majority of Middle Eastern oil supplies, and as the Chinese government
wishes to limit vulnerability to the international oil market, there is a policy to encourage
investment in Africa, courting states that the West have overlooked. Consequently, this
approach towards securing access to African resources is what David Zweig and Bi Jianhai
(2005, 31) have dubbed a resource-based foreign policy, which, by its very nature, has ‘little
room for morality’. The potential fall-out in terms of China’s reputation on the continent that
stems from such a milieu has at times damaged China’s overall reputation and promoted a
growing maturity in policy calculations.
The interest in ensuring its resource security and economic growth through involvement
in Africa is by no means restricted to oil, and encompasses all natural resources. From
investment in copper in Zambia, and platinum interests in Zimbabwe, to supporting ﬁshing
ventures in Gabon and Namibia, Chinese corporations have vigorously courted and pur-
sued the political and business élite in Africa so as to guarantee continued access—often
lubricated with ‘sweetener’ deals provided by central government. One of the beneﬁts of
Chinese interest in African resources is that it has dramatically increased demand and has
revitalized industries such as Zambia’s copper industry. However, the inﬂux of capital into
weak and authoritarian governments also has potential for long-term consequences in Africa,
as leaders may be tempted to neglect necessary reforms, bolstered by newly perceived eco-
nomic security from Chinese receipts. Yet this is not a problem that can be speciﬁcally
associated with Chinese engagement with Africa and is in fact intimately linked to the nature
of the state in much of Africa. Indeed, in this regard there is a real danger that China is
being constructed (particularly within government and political circles in Washington DC,
but also in some African capitals) as some sort of scapegoat for failures that have very little
to do with it.
Indeed, on the one hand, one must note that, with the exception of oil exports to China,
Sino-African trade is generally lopsided in favour of Chinese exporters, who are penetrating
African markets with cheap household products. Such imports into Africa have been criti-
cized as doing little to encourage indigenous African manufacturing. Yet, on the other hand, it
is the failure of African economies to industrialize and to develop post-independence that
means that they produce very few processed goods and are a natural target for Chinese
exporters.
However, Chinese trade ﬁgures with Africa need to be treated with caution. The part
played by Hong Kong as a transit point for Chinese imports and exports makes bilateral
ﬁgures very dubious when estimating the levels of Chinese trade. A huge proportion of Chinese
exports are routed through Hong Kong. This is important in calculating bilateral trade
ﬁgures, because whether or not an export is counted as a Chinese re-export or not obviously
has an enormous bearing on trade statistics. In addition, ﬁrms invested with foreign capital
account for just over half of all Chinese trade, i.e., much of Chinese trade is not actually
Chinese at all, and, if domestic Chinese producers who produce under contract for export
using foreign components are included, the ﬁgure goes upwards. In actual fact, the majority
of Chinese exports are produced by foreign-funded enterprises, often joint ventures, but
increasingly wholly foreign owned (Breslin 2007, 107). Any visitor to an African market
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 these days will observe huge amounts of Chinese-made products on sale—that is not in
dispute. However, the speciﬁc (and colossal) ﬁgures regarding Sino-African trade provided
by the Chinese government do need to be taken with due caution.
Complicating this whole issue is the fact that many of the products manufactured in
China, but sold in African markets, are not actually brought to the continent by Chinese,
but by African, traders. There are now quite elaborate trading networks linking China and
Africa, and much of this is centred in the southern province of Guangdong, where a relatively
large population of African entrepreneurs now live and make deals. Indeed, in Guangzhou
city there are an estimated 20,000 Nigerians living and working in the city. Other African
traders have long been established in Hong Kong, primarily based at Chungking Mansions
in Tsim Sha Tsui, while Yiwu in Zhejiang Province is now a growing centre for export
trading to Africa and elsewhere. In fact, Yiwu is perhaps the key place where products from
China are sold in wholesale quantities to traders from across Africa. African entrepreneurs
generally buy in bulk, utilizing Chinese-owned cargo companies, and products are shipped
direct to the continent.
The point of the above is crucial: Chinese traders are not ‘ﬂooding’ the African market
with cheap Chinese goods. Rather, Africans are actively facilitating the penetration of
Africa by Chinese-made products. Figures do not exist on what proportion of goods sold in
Africa’s markets were brought in by Chinese entrepreneurs or by African traders, but
information gleaned in various interviews and from observations in a variety of African
marketplaces suggests that a large percentage was sourced and shipped by Africans. This is
somewhat ironic, given that condemnation by many African trade unions and civil society
organizations of the ‘Asian tsunami’ in cheap products lays the blame squarely on the Chinese.
If the trade pattern between Africa and China is becoming ‘colonial’ in character, it is with
the active connivance of many Africans themselves. And as the activities of African entrepre-
neurs in Hong Kong, Yiwu, and Guangzhou demonstrate, ‘processes of globalization generate
both localised and internationalised networks of relationships that need to be considered
alongside the bilateral to gain a full understanding of how best to theorise contemporary
Chinese international relations’ (Breslin 2007, 25).
A Chinese model?
Politically, as well as economically, China’s presence in Africa has been based on the pre-
mise of providing an alternate development model for African states and leaders. According
to Naidu and Davies (2006, 80), China is seen as ‘a refreshing alternative to the traditional
engagement models of the West … African governments see China’s engagement as a point
of departure from Western neo-colonialism and political conditions’. Yet the absolute
emphasis that China places on respect for state sovereignty, with non-interference being an
article of faith for the Chinese leadership, as well as China’s willingness to deal with states
ostracized by the West, may appear promising to some African leaders, but this profoundly
challenges the Western vision of a ﬂourishing Africa governed by democracies that respect
human rights and the rule of law and embrace free markets. A common bond in their desire to
overcome and shake oﬀ the legacy of colonialism has further united Chinese and African
political interests, with the former colonial powers portrayed as a common enemy.
In countering theWestern promotion of neo-liberal reforms in Africa, China has argued that
this imposition of Western ideology on African states is a form of neo-imperialism. More-
over, China’s state-directed model of development provides an appealing alternative to lea-
ders when neo-liberal economic reforms have not, for a variety of reasons, delivered their
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 promised economic revival. A strong state also of course serves as a shield for authoritarian
leaders to maintain tight control over economic policy and continue their patronage networks.
Through political and business summits, such as the various Sino-African forums, as well
as state visits by high-ranking Chinese political oﬃcials, China symbolically accords Africa
equal diplomatic status with the dominant powers. For instance, as an emblematic gesture,
it has become a tradition that the ﬁrst overseas visit that China’s Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs
undertakes each year is to Africa. Equally, the African élite are deeply appreciative of being
given the red carpet treatment whenever they turn up in Beijing. A research trip to Beijing
in September 2007 coincided with the visit of Chad’s President, and it was quite revealing the
way in which the visit was covered (with top billing on Chinese television and in the newspapers)
and how the Chadian ﬂag was prominently displayed around Tiananmen Square.
In contrast, when an African leader visits London, United Kingdom or Washington, unless
they are from South Africa or Egypt or one of the few states deemed important, they are
barely aﬀorded a few minutes of government time and even then they are more likely to be
belaboured for their numerous chronic failures in governance, than they are to be toasted
as ‘dear friends’ and importantly, credible statesmen. China’s leadership realizes this and thus
expends energy on massaging the egos of Africa’s leaders. This pays oﬀ. China has been
successful in gaining African support at institutions such as the UN, where the vote of the
African bloc has allowed China to block resolutions on domestic human rights abuses. African
support also of course helped Beijing in its campaign to host the 2008 Olympics.
Symbolic diplomacy, deﬁned as the promotion of national representation abroad, has
become an increasingly important component of Chinese foreign policy in Africa and else-
where (see Kurlantzick 2007). For a developing nation, China’s policy-makers in Beijing are
very much aware of the importance of prestige projects in asserting the power of state lea-
ders and thus have been involved in large-scale projects of this nature, such as building
national stadiums, all over Africa. This approach has proven beneﬁcial to both the ruling élite
in Africa, who view these as projections of regime legitimacy and power (and suitably impressive
to the local population) and to the Chinese government, as it demonstrates China’s rising
prominence and presence. Through these kinds of project, combined with aid packages and
the notion that China may be a ‘model’ for Africa, China is very much asserting itself as an
equal of Western powers as well as appealing to the African élite classes. Indeed, Dirlik
(2006) notes that the ‘Beijing Consensus’ draws its meaning and appeal not from some
coherent set of economic or political ideas à la Ramo (2004), but from its intimation of an
alternative pole, from which those opposed to the USA and, by extension, the West can
draw inspiration. As Breslin (2007, 2) notes, ‘China’s alternative path is partly attractive because
of the apparent success of the experience of economic reform. Other developing states
might also lean towards the Chinese way not just because China’s leaders don’t attach demo-
cratizing and liberalizing conditions to bilateral relations, but also because China is coming
to provide alternative sources of economic opportunities (with non-democratizing strings
attached)’.
However, Africa’s intellectuals must approach with caution the notion that China oﬀers
up an alternative model of development. Firstly, conceptions of Chinese ‘soft power’ built
on ‘the appeal of China as an economic model’ (Kurlantzick 2006, 5) overstate the ability
of China to project and promote an alternative economic type (Yan, 2006). It is true that
economically liberalizing while preserving an authoritarian political system might be appealing
to some African autocrats, but this surely has its limits, not least to the Chinese themselves
in promoting such a message, given that supporting the authoritarian élite in Zimbabwe
and Sudan has already stimulated anti-Chinese feelings among African civil society leaders.
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 Furthermore, China’s sustained growth has taken place not only with no reference to democ-
racy or transparency, but has also generally shunned policy reforms promoted from outside.
This must seem attractive for those African leaders who have no real legitimacy or who are
tired of having to fend oﬀ criticisms from the international ﬁnancial institutions and the wider
donor community.
Yet, China’s extraordinary economic growth has come about, certainly initially, within
the broader context of a capable state and in a region that is itself economically dynamic.
Rapid economic growth without democratization as per the East Asian model often required
a strong developmental state. Analysis of China within this vein generally conﬁrms such a
proposition (Ming Xia 2000), though with certain caveats (Breslin 1996). Contrast this with
Africa. Granted even the relative declining reach of the Chinese state as liberalization
progresses (Wang, H. 2003), the type of comparative internal strength and concomitant
stability that China is able to draw on is beyond the ambition of most—if not all—current
African leaders.
Furthermore, the irony is that those who applaud alternatives to Western-dominated global
institutions often—sometimes perhaps without realizing—end up in a position where they
not only support the authoritarian status quo in some African states, but also the emerging
leadership of China. Opposition to neo-liberalism—something that has considerable appeal—
can result in the promotion, not of social democracy, nor even Keynesian liberalism, but of
illiberal authoritarianism. As Zha Daojiong notes (2005d), within China itself there is a
debate as to whether or not the Latin American fate of social polarization, international
dependency and economic stagnation is China’s future fate unless appropriate policies are
implemented. These debates often question the capitalist direction of the Chinese government’s
current course, again destabilizing the notion of a ‘model’ (seeWang, C. 2003; Wang, H. 2003).
Even if we disagree with Gordon Chang’s forecast (2002), such analyses of the so-called
‘China miracle’ (Wu, Y. 2003), which oﬀer up less sanguine interpretations, seem to have
been missed by those advocating the Chinese model. Ironically, it is quite noticeable these
days how touchy many African intellectuals are to any criticism of China or the suggestion
that China is possibly not the saviour of Africa, often defending China’s record on human
rights within the African context.
Human rights
Perhaps the aspect of Chinese engagement with Africa that is most controversial is the issue
of human rights. It is certainly true that China’s relations with some of the more egregious
regimes in Africa cannot be seen as typical of Sino-African relations as a whole. But, con-
versely, it is precisely because of the negative attention that China’s ties with such regimes
has generated, as well as the very real and destructive nature of such administrations, that a
discussion of China’s stance on human rights in its Sino-African relations is justiﬁed. Equally,
the notion that it is not China’s business or duty to promote good governance or broad
human rights (something that oﬃcial Chinese statements have inferred) and that China’s
non-interference principle is valid in all cases and at all times contrasts with the growing
norms of international accountability.
Obviously, the notion of human rights is an essentially contested concept, and the Chi-
nese state and outside critics invariably speak past one another when engaging on this issue.
China’s discourse on rights is long-standing and has characteristic concerns that need to be
taken seriously by anyone who seeks to engage with the Chinese state. It is also important
to note that struggles about human rights have long been a way in which power plays
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 between countries that adhere to diﬀerent political or economic models can be acted out.
In this way, the persistent demand from Western governments to universalize ‘international
human rights’, which, when boiled down to its essence, is arguably about universalizing spe-
ciﬁcally Western capitalist values, can be ﬂagged by China and its African allies as reﬂecting
neo-colonial impulses (Breslin and Taylor 2008). In addition, China’s leadership may be seek-
ing ways to rationalize its policies on human rights in a way that universalizes China’s post-
Mao developmental trajectories (Sullivan 1999, 24). This is arguably a feature of the so-called
‘Beijing Consensus’ touted by some commentators, as well as a product of anti-hegemonism,
the ﬁve principles, and statist development thinking.
But as Weatherley (1999) notes, some of the most egregious violations of human rights in
Africa with which China is arguably held to be complicit (on account of its active support
for the oﬀending regimes), cannot be justiﬁed even in terms of the Chinese discourse on human
rights. This is particularly so when the Chinese position on human rights intimately links
social development and welfare to the concept. This is a perfectly respectable position to take,
but the Chinese government’s own coherence on the issue is arguably undermined by its diplo-
macy in practice, if and when Chinese policy supports regimes that are anti-developmental.
It is evident that some states that enjoy close Chinese support, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe,
not only crush the civil and political rights of their citizens, but also threaten the economic and
social rights of the population. The Union of Myanmar could also be seen as an example of
China trying and failing to maintain the sharp separation between trade and human rights.
Given that the economic and social rights of people are held by China to be central in its
discourse on human rights, this is surely problematic. As noted in a number of chapters in
this collection, most notably Carlson’s, China deploys a particular stance on state sovereignty
i.e., that sovereignty is the ultimate guarantor of human rights and that it is therefore the
choice of each sovereign state to institute its own understandings of the rights of its people.
This is all very well, and of course state sovereignty is the cornerstone of the international
system, without which anarchy might reign. Yet the reiﬁcation of states and the amalgamation
of sovereignty and rights into a single principle of non-interference arguably loses much of its
meaning in a milieu dominated by quasi-states, neo-patrimonial regimes and even warlordism.
Yet as Li Xing (1996, 40) notes, the diﬃculty facing China’s rulers is that, on the one
hand, they have sought national independence from Western political inﬂuence and, on the
other hand, they have sought to ‘catch up’ with the West and modernize the economy
through ever-deeper integration with the capitalist world market. This contradiction is often
played out around human rights issues and, in fact, taking the analysis further, it might be
argued that infringing some human rights in China itself (poor labour conditions, for instance)
is a pre-condition for China’s reintegration into the global political economy, something which
is actively encouraged by the West and its proﬁt-seeking corporations. Indeed, it is a fact
that ‘human rights abuses under the banner of “preserving order” are aimed at maintaining
the position of the ruling elements [in China]. But it is also undeniable that the state sees
the necessity to maintain long-term stability and predictability of the system in order to
attract much-needed foreign investment and technology’ (Li, X. 1996, 34). In this light,
critiquing China’s human rights stance when it is played out in Africa, while selectively
overlooking the abuses that underpin much of the consumer boom in the developed world,
driven in part by cheap Chinese imports, lacks coherence, as does ignoring continued
Western support for assorted dictators and corrupt regimes across Africa.
However, such analysis does not help the average Zimbabwean or Sudanese labouring
under an autocratic and oppressive government and casting a weary eye at Chinese support
for her oppressor. We can pontiﬁcate about hypocrisy and selectivity, but Zimbabwe is still
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 collapsing, and women are still being raped in Darfur, Sudan. Here, the Chinese govern-
ment’s thinking on non-interference and its hands-oﬀ attitude vis-à-vis human rights and
governance needs to modify if it is to avoid being cast by critics as a friend of despots. There is
actually some evidence that a rethink is occurring, and Chinese thinking on human rights
and sovereignty ‘is less a static concept than an idea in ﬂux’ (Gill and Reilly 2000, 42).
Indeed:
Beijing’s recent handling of the situation in Sudan shows that it is learning the limitations
of non-interference, however much that principle remains part of its oﬃcial rhetoric.
The concept may have been useful when China was relatively weak and trying to protect
itself from foreign interference. But China has found non-interference increasingly
unhelpful as it learns the perils of tacitly entrusting its business interests to repressive
governments.
(Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008, 47)
It is true that at the moment there appears to be some divergence between Western and
Chinese policy aims regarding governance and that this then at times suggests a convergence
between China and certain types of African leader. However, this can only ever be tem-
porary in nature if China wishes to have a long-running and stable relationship with Africa.
China is like all other actors in Africa—it needs stability and security in order for its invest-
ments to ﬂourish and for its connections with the continent to be coherent. As Obiorah
(2007, 40) notes, ‘After an initial phase of snapping up resource extraction concessions, it is
almost conceivable that China will be compelled by instability and conﬂict in Africa to
realize that its long term economic interests are best served by promoting peace in Africa
and that this is most likely to come about by encouraging representative government in
Africa rather than supporting dictators.’
Thus, while in the current period there sometimes appears to be divergence, there can
ultimately only be growing convergence with Western policy aims—maybe not with regard
to democracy (though China is itself evolving in interesting directions), but certainly with
regard to governance and security and, by implication, a greater connection to the down-
side of supporting regimes that undermine development and China’s own notions of human
rights.
Furthermore, China’s integration into the global economy and the concomitant respon-
sibilities that have come with this greater incorporation necessitate structural and systemic
reforms, particularly through increasing membership of multilateral bodies. In the long
term these could conceivably have an impression on China in the development of a regime
that incorporates increased respect for the rule of law and better safeguarding of universal
human rights.
For instance, the Chinese government’s key commitments pertaining to its membership
of the WTO comprise responsibility to advance the transparency, consistency and standar-
dization of China’s legal system. And it is more than obvious that, over the past 20 years or
so, the Chinese government has signed up to and ratiﬁed a growing number of international
instruments pertaining to human rights and labour as it embeds itself in various multilateral
regimes (Lanteigne 2005). Recognizing that diﬀerent interpretations of human rights may
exist, but working to ensure that the sorts of abuses seen in Sudan or Zimbabwe are not
repeated, is in the interest of both China and the West if stability and long-term relation-
ships with Africa’s economies are desired. On the basis of the evidence, it appears that the
Chinese leadership is beginning to realize this.
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 Conclusions
Chinese foreign policy in Africa has been based on several key aims. The Chinese govern-
ment has focused on assuring its regime of security through access to crucial resources. By
portraying itself as an advocate for the developing world and emphasizing the rhetoric of
South-South co-operation, China has arguably sought to oﬀer itself up as an alternative
model to Western dominance. However, to achieve its policy goals, China has equally been
prepared to defend autocratic regimes, some of which commit gross human rights abuses,
such as in Sudan. As a repressive government in its own right, the Chinese leadership has
little sympathy with civil society in Africa if and when it challenges perceived Chinese
interests and, too often, China has sided with authoritarian regimes. In this way, China’s
interactions with the continent ﬁt the pattern of most external actors’ intercourse with
Africa: beneﬁcial to the ruling élite, but to the long-term disadvantage of Africa’s peoples.
However, it must be emphasized that China’s policies towards Africa are evolving and
maturing, and China is going through a steep learning curve. Recent developments suggest
that China is starting to realize that, like all other actors in Africa, it needs stability and
security in order for its investments to ﬂourish and for its connections with the continent to
be coherent. The history and development of Sino-African relations thus far suggest certain
patterns, but the relationship is ﬂuid and ever changing. Indeed, it has to be said that, in
relative terms, the exponential increase in Chinese trade with Africa from the start of this
century means that we are in the very early stages of a solidiﬁed Sino-African relationship,
even though formal ties between China and Africa go back decades. Thus far the reper-
cussions of this sustained and in-depth political and economic involvement by the Chinese
in broad-based development in Africa has yet to be ascertained.
What can be stated is that Sino-African relations are processes not of colonization, but of
globalization and the reintegration of China into the global economy—a project that has
enjoyed the hitherto enthusiastic support of Western capitalism. At present the picture
appears mixed—there are instances where the Chinese role in Africa is clearly positive and
appreciated. Equally, there are issues where the Chinese government is, at present at least,
playing an equivocal role, which arguably threatens to unravel some of the progress made
in Africa in recent times on issues of good governance and accountability. China’s current
role in Africa is, like all other external actors, diverse, and its eﬀect in the continent varies
widely depending on local economic and political circumstance. A balanced appraisal of the
various themes of China’s engagement in Africa is needed. The diversity of both China and
Africa, as well as the nature of the individual African states where Chinese interests operate,
is of central importance, if we are to have a coherent picture of what is going on.
Where there is coherence in Sino-African relations, a key intention is to encourage Chinese
corporations to ‘go global’ (zouchuqu), which encourages Chinese corporations to invest
overseas, play a role in international capital markets (see Hong and Sun 2006) and help
towards the policy of ensuring regime security through gaining access to crucial resources.
A Chinese Ministry of Commerce statement has in fact averred that Africa is ‘one of the
most important regions for carrying out our “go outward” strategy’ (quoted in Gu, X. 2005,
8). The resulting hike in commodity prices has been potentially good for much of Africa’s
economies, although the income from this phenomenon is obviously uneven and dependent
upon a country’s resource attributes. Certainly, in terms of receipts for such commodities,
beneﬁts are skewed to only certain economies. South Africa provides iron ore and plati-
num, while the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia supply copper and cobalt.
Timber is sourced from Gabon, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville and Liberia, while various
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 west and central African nations supply raw cotton to Chinese textile factories. However, it
is oil that remains China’s biggest commercial interest in Africa—between 1996 and 2005,
nearly 71% of the total composition of sub-Saharan Africa’s exports to China were mineral
fuels (Mwega 2007, 4). Given the nature of the oil industry globally—but particularly in
Africa—this has attracted criticism.
Until relatively recently there was an arguable complacency within the Chinese govern-
ment about its policies in Africa. The attitude seemed to be that third party criticism (or
even internal African condemnation) was motivated by ‘China-bashing’ and could be safely
disregarded. However, a ﬂurry of extremely negative articles in the international media about
Sino-African ties, as well as incidents on the ground in Africa, have stimulated a rethink in
China. Although the Chinese government bristles at being singled out for criticism for its
policies in Africa, it can be argued that since China is a rising power and arguably a great
one, it has to accept the fact that it can no longer hide behind the idea of being a developing
state—the fact that, once a state becomes a great power (or at least is perceived by many to
be such), its policies will be placed much more directly under the microscope, especially by
other great powers jockeying for inﬂuence. The USA and the USSR had to learn this during
the last century, and China is facing this fact today, albeit reluctantly. In fact, it is now
acknowledged within the Chinese government that there is a desperate need to promote the
positive side of Chinese diplomacy in Africa, and this facet of China’s links with African states
is receiving more and more attention. It will be interesting to see how China accommodates
Africa’s intricacies as its involvement in Africa broadens and deepens.
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